An inconvenient Choice, still a choice

The residents of Mogadishu and other central Somali towns had in 2006 welcomed the expulsion of the warlords, but their replacement by the ICU, much less so. Obviously, the warlords had made their lives difficult for more than a decade and they hoped for something better. They were happy to see the warlords go, but they were not expecting the Islamic Courts to be transformed into an armed political group attempting to impose a fundamentalist ‘Salafi’ version of Islam on Somali society. The Islamic Courts have, knowingly or unknowingly, already come under heavy influcence and indeed patronage of the extremist al-Shabab, their policies led to outrage and discontent among the population.The new Islamist rulers had brought a measure of peace, but also a new type of clerical control and limitation of individual freedom that most Somalis neither believed in nor could accept—and one very open to abuse. The Islamic Courts’ original mission was to improve security, bring social justice and combat iniquity. However, there have always been those who saw the courts as a vehicle for the creation of an Islamic state. This is what happened recently. After capturing Mogadishu, its mission transformed into imposing sharia law all over Somalia and changing the constitution. The whole movement was hijacked by extremist elements resulting in a fatal collision locally and regionally. The rest , as they say,is history: the TFG supported by the Ethiopian army entered Moqadishu. Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in pursuit of what Ethiopia perceives as its legitimate national security interest—namely to ensure that the Transitional Federal Government defeats its adversary, the Union of Islamic Courts—has made it a major player in events shaping Somalia. That was not bad.

Nonetheless, recent Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, as mentioned previously, suffered from two major weaknesses. One it was not supported by a workable political formula. In the process it tried to impose the TFG by force and as a consequence came to be only associated with one political force in a highly politically fragmented country. Though the TFG is widely recognised as a legitimate government internationally its claim is highly contested internally. Secondly, Ethiopian intervention was not anchored in a clearly articulated international support plan. Since, Ethiopia had to run against time to save the TFG from collapse and had to stop the UIC from expanding one can say there was no enough time for Ethiopia to be able to garner concrete international support for its pro-TFG military operations in Somalia. But still it is a major weakness.

The same Somalis who cheered up to the rise of the Islamic Courts to power, this time hopping for something better, have also welcomed the expulsion of the UIC in early 2007 by the Ethiopian army. Both Somaliland and Puntland came out strongly against any establishment of ICU strongholds in their territory and were enthusiastic about Ethiopia’s decision to intervene. Ethiopian military intervention was not only legitimate, but also it had the support of many Somalis, including inhabitants of Moqadishu. But the shortcomings that accompanied the intervention continue to haunt both Ethiopia and the TFG. While the military solution was moving fast, the desired political solution was lagging behind..Despite the lofty rhetoric and in the face of favorable military developments on the ground the international community remained complacent and expectations of robust peace support operations continued to be stilted. Worse, the war in Moqadishu and its environes led to a very sad humanitarian situation. Less hopes to more ones, and more hopes to nighttmares. This is attributed to several reasons,prominent among which is the inability of the TFG to deliver security. Peace and state building in Somalia, more than in any other African country, requires capable and experienced leadership with extensive resources and expertise. Moreover, the TFG lacks the institutional capacity to manage political and social conflict effectively. the TFG as it is now designated, lacks representative legitimacy and credibility. This obviously hampers any efforts it might make to extend its appeal. It would obviously have been more intelligent if the Ethiopians and other allies of the TFG had emphasized the political expediency of reaching out to moderate Islamists and Hawiye heavyweights.

It seems unlikely that any meaningful change and improvement in the security situation will take place unless this pretension that things are in the right direction and that the TFG is doing fine is abandoned, and the TFG considers its role as a transitional one to prepare the ground for a government of national unity and democratic elections in Somalia. Unless TFG leaders view their role as precursors to a more inclusive political process and democratic transition and are prepared to throw their hat in to the ring, then Somalia’s problems will not only linger but also might worsen. The only way out is to to bring all the major players in Somalia to the negotiating table and erect a political deal with the Mahakim . The momentum for popular regional conferences to be run by the TFG as a way of garnering support, legitimacy and stability is lost. The only way to realise the way forward and facilitate Ethiopia’s orderly withdrawal is by facilitating a seriouse political dialogue between the TFG and the Ma’hakim.

The nature of the state, its make up and character and the nature of its institutions have always been contested. Not to mention that none of these phenomena have ever been seriously addressed, if at all, in those 14-plus so-called reconciliation conferences that the nation witnessed over the last 17 years. Arguably, all these questions have only lingered on to haunt the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as they did the previous Transitional National Government (TNG). But that is not the whole story. This time however Somalia is not a managable crisis. Whatever happens there will have far greater consequences to Ethiopia than ever before. And I think the choices are painfully clear.

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com

April 11, 2008